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CHAP TER 1. Int ro duct ion and overview 
Traditionally, we have limited our construction of solutions to computer and network secu-
rity concerns confidentiality, integrity, and assurance to the purview of the digital domain. 
To secure our ones and zeros, we render them unintelligible by means of encryption, or ex-
change precursor bits back and forth between interested parties, performing operations and 
checks upon them at each passing, before allowing access to the desired bits, as is the case 
in authentication schemes, for example. while this level of abstraction leaves us wholly igno-
rant of the physical representation and state of the bits, it can, in certain instances, provide 
definite proof of the soundness of our methods (formal modeling of systems, Wegman-Carter 
authentication, and one-time pads), or, at the very least, allow us to state that given our 
current knowledge of various algorithms (RSA, elliptic curve DLP, AES, and SHA), theorems 
(NP-completeness), and state-of--the-art technology, the said bits should be sufficiently secure 
for the next n-years. 
Perhaps this is all very natural, as the information we are attempting to secure and ma-
nipulate is in-fact digital; i.e., we care only about the digital representation of the information 
and not it's physical representation. However, even for clearly physical problems we are apt to 
search for digital solutions. The digital data riding the emanations of our wireless transceivers 
are encrypted, so as to deny access to the network to unauthorized users and prevent eaves-
dropping. Even electromagnetic emission vulnerabilities, such as TEMPEST, traditionally 
dealt with through the use of Faraday cages, have been met with digital solutions [Kuhn and 
Anderson (1998)] . In short, if there is a physical problem then there is almost certainly a 
digital solution. 
While it is essential that our approach to the aforementioned security concerns incorporate 
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digital techniques, do we perhaps overestimate the capabilities of this domain and underesti-
mate its analog counterpart as a source of solutions? 
To set forth but one example, consider the the limitations of current network access control 
methods that rely on the use of digital tokens or identifiers (usernames and passwords, MAC 
addresses, SSL certificates, WEP or wPA keys, etc) to prevent unauthorized access. Even 
strong tokens and identifiers, such as SSL certificates, by their purely digital nature, can 
be discretely copied if improperly secured, and put to use by malicious users. Even worse, 
popular weak identifiers, such as MAC addresses, may be easily obtained through passive 
network monitoring, and spoofed through the use Of a programmable network card. In contrast, 
using certain unique physical characteristics Of devices for identification, in conjunction with 
current digital approaches, could enhance security, as they are nearly impossible to obtain (a 
measurement cannot be done without physical access to the medium) and duplicate. we call 
such an approach security through physicality. 
1.1 The DILON Project 
The Detecting Intrusions at Layer ONe (DILON) project embraces the principle Of security 
through physicality by using the analog and digital characteristics of digital devices for such 
security purposes as intrusion detection (discovering node impersonation and network tamper-
ing), authentication (preventing unauthorized access to the physical network), forensic data 
collection (tying a physical device to a specific network incident), and assurance monitoring 
(determining whether a device will Or is in the process Of failing) . 
Certainly, digital solutions offer much in the way Of addressing the security concerns asso-
ciated with computer and network monitoring and access control, but in each of the aforemen-
tioned areas the available techniques are lacking in some respect. We have already mentioned 
that authentication schemes are vulnerable to the theft of digital tokens (which is not to imply 
that the physical devices we seek to monitor are immune to theft, only that their absence 
is more likely to be noticed sooner). Similarly, in other areas of security, shortcomings arise 
because Of the limitations Of the digital domain: determining the presence Of spoofed Or im-
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personated devices for intrusion detection, demonstrably tying a particular device to a specific 
network connection after the fact in forensic analysis, and addressing impending failures rather 
than notification of failure in assurance monitoring. In order to address these concerns, we 
propose making use of the hardware and manufacturing inconsistencies that cause minute and 
unique variations in signaling behavior of every digital device for identification and monitor-
ing purposes. In this respect, the DILON project embodies a certain set of signal processing 
techniques that seek to make these variations manifest through appropriate application and 
interpretation. 
Central to the security of this method is the belief that these slight variations are difficult, 
if not impossible, to control and duplicate. This assumption is founded upon knowledge of the 
variable tolerances of device components, which are introduced in the design and fabrication 
processes, used in the construction of digital devices. These tolerances allow for unpredictable 
variations in the overall electrical operation of the device. Simply put, because of these vari-
ations, no two devices may be made exactly the same, and hence their analog signal charac-
teristics cannot be made the same, without substantial reverse-engineering beyond the reach 
of all but the most determined attackers. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the amount of inherent variation (in the time and frequency 
domains, respectively) in the signaling behavior of lOMb Ethernet devices. The two most 
important questions concerning signal variation are its extent and consistency; i.e., how ap-
preciable is this variation and is it stable over time? This work is an attempt to answer these 
questions for the case of 10Mb Ethernet devices. 
1.1.1 Approach 
The DILON approach makes use of anomaly detection based upon the layer-specific be-
havior of the Physical and Data Link layers; This is achieved by monitoring the analog char-
acteristics of the synchronization signals used in 10Mb Ethernet systems, and linking changes 
in MAC addresses to their corresponding physical representation, for example, to determine 
whether the digital hardware address matches the expected physical signal. A profile, repre-
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Figure 1.1 A single period of the synchronization signals from three loMb 
Ethernet devices, aligned. 
renting the expected device behavior, is generated from training data before identification of 
possible anomalous activity begins. This profile is used to determine whether new information, 
in the form of electrical signals received from the device being monitored, conforms to previous 
behavior. Periodically, the device's profile is updated, so as to compensate for the expected 
drift in it's performance. 
In the present approach, an optimal detector, the matched filter, is used to create profiles of 
signals by applying the filter to various sections of a lOMb Ethernet frame; whereby, the output 
of the filter, as well as the expected deviance from this output, is used in the construction of 
the profile. 
1.1.2 Implementation 
Figure 1.3 presents asystem-level diagram for an implementation of DILON technology. 
On the top of the diagram are subject devices that communicate over a physical medium—
wired or unwired—to connect with a controlled device, a switch or access point for instance. 
At the control device an analog tap is used in conjunction with an analog-to-digital converter 
(ADC) to sample the electrical signals arriving across the medium, at a much higher rate 
and with greater resolution than is necessary to actually decode the signal. Storage will also 
be required to store device profiles. A policy engine will make use of a comparison module 
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Figure 1.2 Spectral power of the synchronization signals from three lOMb 
Ethernet devices. 
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to determine which devices have access to the network, as well as issue reports concerning 
the state of the network. Daniels et al. (2005) and Mina et al. (2005) have elucidated the 
DILON implementation and paradigm more completely, and have provided instances of possible 
deployment beyond wired Ethernet, including wireless and mesh networks. 
1.2 Previous work 
Signal detection, classification, and identification was one of the major challenges in the 
research and development of radar and wireless communication systems for a greater part of the 
20th century. In particular, identification of radar, radios, and various wireless communications 
became a very important and popular topic around the time of World War II [Jones (1978)]. 
Indeed, research into radar detection and signature evaluation is ongoing in the military to 
this day [Mensa et al. (2003); Overman and Overman (1979)]. 
Broadly speaking, we may divide identification and classification techniques into two cat-
egories: those that make use of direct measurements of analog characteristics, and those that 
note digital difFerences made manifest through aberrations stemming from physical compo- 
nents. The former category may be further subdivided along the lines of the analysis domain 
(time or frequency) or the portion of the signal used in the analysis (transient or steady-state). 
Transient analysis has traditionally been the most popular; in fact, most early methods 
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Figure 1.3 Functional view of an anomaly detection system incorporating 
DILON technology. 
for radar identification were based upon transient analysis. As higher frequency and faster 
responding circuits were introduced, more in-depth transient analysis became necessary for 
transmitter identification. In modern use, these methods have only proved successful in sit-
uations when the transmitters under consideration are of different makes, [Ellis and Serinken 
(2001)] for example. 
The use of Bayesian step change detectors to determine the beginning of a transient, in 
conjunction with fractal dimension analysis for feature extraction, have also been used to iden-
tify transmitters using the amplitude and phase data of the transient separately [Ureten and 
Serinken (1999); Hall et al. (2003)]. Multifractal analysis of transients, utilizing a probabilistic 
neural network for classification, has also been used to successfully classify difFerent model 
transmitters [Shaw and Kinsner (1997)]. 
In [Hall et al. (2004)], transient amplitude and phase information were both used to classify 
devices using a Kalman filter. A Bayesian filter was used to determine the final classification 
of a device after transient data from ten transmissions were obtained. 
Patents have also been filed that make use of deviations from the carrier frequency in the 
transient [Ferrell (1991)] and steady-state [F~ederick (1995)] portions of the signals to identify 
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avionics transmitters and prevent cellular telephone cloning, respectively. Elaborate systems 
for the accurate and efficient of collection of wireless signals for identification purposes have 
also been patented [Hoogerwerf et al. (2000); Kaplan and Stanhope (1999)]. 
Techniques using the maximal difference in amplitude between the same frequency or range 
of frequencies of two different signals for classification have also been put forth [Kamarainen 
et al. (2002)]. Atime-domain weighted difference technique, whereby the difFerences between 
two signals are raised to an arbitrary power and then summed form the fingerprint, has also 
been proposed for the identification of cellular telephones [Barrere et al. (1998)]. Differences 
in the local extrema of wavelet coefficients, obtained through the application of the Wavelet 
'I~ansform to the transient, have also been used in transmitter identification [Hippenstiel and 
Payal (1996); Payal (1995)]. Genetic algorithms have also been employed to determine which 
wavelet coefficients should be used for this type of transient analysis [Toonstra and Kinsner 
(1995)]. These methods bear some slight resemblance to the DILON DFV technique discussed 
by Jackson (2006), in that they focus on taking the difference between an expected signal and 
a test signal. 
It is important to note that in all of the preceding cases, the various techniques were only 
able to achieve limited success in identifying signals originating from the same model of device. 
In the latter category, recent work has investigated the possibility of remotely fingerprint-
ing devices over the Internet by measuring their clock skew through the TCP timestamps 
option [Kohno et al. (2005)]. The efficacy of this method is difficult to measure, as the au-
thors fail report either the overall false negatives and positives, or the time required to reliably 
identify a device. 
Recently, work in the development of physical authentication schemes has led to the creation 
of a physical token that implements a physical one-way function, which is verified using a 
statistical hashing algorithm [Ravikanth (2001)]. 
A physical authentication system was introduced by Gassend et al. (2003) that identified 
FPGAs based upon the delay characteristics of the logic path in the integrated circuit used 
to compute 128 hash-based challenge-response pairs. In related work, it was suggested that 
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delays be intentionally added to the logic circuitry in order to improve security [Gassend et al. 
(2002b)]. Using these techniques it is also possible for devices and another entities to generate 
mutually known shared secrets [Gassend et al. (2002a)]. 
Finally, many of the other DILON techniques have been chronicled by Jackson (2006). 
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CHAPTER 2. Background Material 
The concepts of systems, signals, filtering, and related terminology and tools are discussed. 
The matched filter operation is defined. 
2.1 Signals and systems 
A system is a process by which an input signal is transformed to produce an output signal; 
furthermore, a system is said to be linear time-invariant (LTI) if the system is both additive 
and multiplicative, and a time shift of the input results in a corresponding time shift in the 
output. It can be shown that the response, or output, of an LTI system to all inputs can be 
completely described by determining the systems unit impulse response [Phillips et al. (2003)]. 
For our purposes, the unit impulse response, or transfer function, of a system in the time 
domain will be denoted by h(t). The response of a system, y(t), to a particular input, x(t), 
can be found by convolving the transfer function of the system with the input signal. The 
convolution operation, denoted by ~, between h(t) and x(t) is defined as 
+roo 
y(t) = h(t) ~ x(t) =J h(t — T)x(T)dT (2.1) 
-~ 
By taking the Fourier Transform of the input signal, denoted by .~{x(t)} = X(cv), and the 
transfer function, denoted by ~{h(t)} = H(c~), the convolution operation defined in (1) may 
be replaced by multiplication 
Y(c~) = H(w)X(w) (2.2) 
It should be noted that (2.2) gives the frequency response of a system, whereas (2.1) gives 
its time-domain response. Of course, these responses are related through the inverse-Fourier 
and Fourier ~ansforms, respectively. 
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2.2 Filters 
A filter may be regarded as a special kind of system, where the relative amplitudes and 
phases of the frequency components of an input signal are modified, or eliminated. As the 
filter discussed in this paper is LTI, we may describe its response via a transfer function. In 
turn, this transfer function may be used in conjunction with either (2.1 or 2.2) to determine 
the response of the filter to an input signal. 
2.3 The matched filter 
The matched filter is said to be an optimal detector, as it can be shown by the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality that the filter maximizes the signal-to-noise ratio of a known input signal in 
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [Couch (1993)]. The transfer function of the matched 
filter, in the frequency domain, at sampling time to may be stated as 
—jc~tp ~w o
T/ P(w) 
where A* (w) is the complex conjugate of the Fourier 'I~ansform of a known time-domain signal 
a(t), P(w) is the power spectral density (PSD) of the noise associated with an input signal, 
and ~ is an arbitrary constant. By selecting an appropriate value of r~ for the operating 
environment, and assuming AWGN for the PSD, P(w) may be eliminated from (2.3). For a 
given input signal, ,~(t), the output of the filter, M to, at sampling time to, in the Gaussian 
noise case is then 
Mto = H(c~)B(w) = A*~w~ eXp—~Wt~ B(w) (2.4) 
where B(w) is the Fourier Transform of the time-domain input signal ,Q(t). 
Taking the inverse Fourier Transform of (2.3) gives the transfer function of the filter, h(t), 
in the time-domain, for the AWGN case, as 
It can be shown that the output of the filter is maximized when [Couch (1993)] 
to
=J a(T)~3(T~CIT 
tp—T 
µto) = h~to) *,~~to) (2.6) 
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where T is the period of the known time-domain signal a(t). 
As can be seen from (2.6), the matched filter operation may be interpreted as the inner- 
product of two signals, or an integrated-correlation. 
12 
CHAPTER 3. Signal profiling 
We describe how the matched filter may be used to create a signal profile useful for iden-
tifying a signal's device of origin. 
3.1 Signal selection rationale 
This work focuses on the profiling of lOMb wired Ethernet signals. We chose to study lOMb 
Ethernet because of the relative simplicity of the electronic devices and signaling involved, and 
its operation at low speeds. As the electronics and signaling are less complicated than higher-
speed systems, we were able to understand the functioning of the devices, and identify common 
behavior between devices of different makes, which aided us in hypothesis creation and testing 
while attempting to identify differences and similarities in signals. In addition, capturing 
accurate samples of lOMb Ethernet frames may be accomplished using lower resolution, slower, 
and therefore less expensive ADCs. 
Wired Ethernet was chosen due to the low noise environment inherent in wired systems. 
Environmental noise adds a stochastic and non-stationary component to the signal that must 
be minimized as much as possible to obtain consistent measurements. On the other hand, noise 
characteristics of an individual device, or component from a device, may exhibit distinguishing 
characteristics. 
Finally, we believed that if we should fail in discriminating 10Mb Ethernet signals, we would 
have little chance of succeeding in the high-speed wired and wireless domains. However, we 
should also note that in some respects profiling lOMb Ethernet signals may be viewed as a more 
difficult problem than that of higher-speed systems: there are fewer components per device, 
and hence less opportunity for signal variability due to perturbation by device components. 
13 
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Figure 3.1 The Preamble of an Ethernet frame used for signal profiling. 
3.2 Identifying a common signal 
In order to create a profile of the signal characteristics for an Ethernet device, a portion of 
the frame preamble common to all devices was identified. In this context, commonality is used 
to denote two distinct and necessary requirements: recurrence and ubiquity; i.e., the common 
portion of the frame must appear at the beginning of each frame for every every device. The 
synchronization signal, named as such because it is sent to synchronize the receiver of the 
destination device to the transmitter of the source device, satisfies both of these requirements. 
This synchronization signal precedes each frame and consists of a 64-bit sequence of alternating 
ones and zeros, encoded using differential Manchester encoding with a fundamental frequency 
of 5MHz, ending with the sequence 10101011 (Figure 3.1) . 
This synchronization signal consists of a transient, or turn-on, portion (denoted by '- . - - 
in Figure 3.1), which is the result of the transmitting circuitry of the sending device powering 
on, as well as a steady state portion (denoted by ' ' in Figure 3.1) that serves as the 
actual synchronization signal. 
As mentioned earlier, most work in signal identification has traditionally focused on the 
transient portion of a signal. However, as the transient signal in loMb Ethernet is so small, in 
terms of the number of wavelengths of the overall signal, we do not believe that there is physi-
cally enough information contained in it for the identification of similar devices. Indeed, it has 
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been shown in the literature that transient analysis is sufficient only for distinguishing between 
devices of different models, but not devices of the same model. As such, our methodology relies 
primarily upon the steady-state portion of the signal for profiling purposes. 
The final portion of the Ethernet frame shown in Figure 3.1 (denoted by ' ') is the 
beginning of the MAC address of the receiving device. Preliminary work with this portion of 
the signal has shown that it may be possible to use the MAC source address for signal profiling. 
3.3 Matched filter creation 
Having identified a common and repetitive portion of the Ethernet signal suitable for 
identification purposes, an exact starting position and period of the portion of the signal to 
be matched to must be chosen. We call this part of the signal the reference signal, and choose 
it to represent the known time-domain signal ~x(t). As per (2.5), the reference signal must be 
reversed in the time-domain, and shifted by to to be used as the filter. In this respect to may 
be regarded as the final time point of the reference signal. 
Initially, the period and position of the reference signal were chosen as an arbitrary number 
of points spanning the length of the synchronization signal. For lOMb Ethernet, we have found 
this acceptable to distinguish between all but the most similar of signals; however, we have also 
developed algorithms to determine the optimal reference signal for a set of known devices. This 
type of reference selection would be useful during a training period, where sample data could 
be taken for a new device introduced on the network, and compared to previously collected 
data of other devices. For a general study of the matched filter, however, we have selected 
a reference signal that includes only the steady-state portion of the synchronization signal, 
which is the same, to within five sample points, for each device. While optimally determining 
a reference signal for a device, in relation to other known devices, may increase performance, 
our experiments have shown that it is not generally necessary to do so. 
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3.4 Creating a signal profile 
The first step in creating a signal profile is to apply the filter to the signal used to create 
it; i.e., convolve the filter with the portion of the signal used for the selection of the reference 
signal. The filter returns a single value from this operation that serves as a baseline. This value 
represents the filter response when a perfect match is made between the filter and the original 
signal. If another signal is exactly the same as the original, then we expect that applying 
the filter to this signal will produce the same value. In general then, applying the filter to a 
signal produces a measurement of the closeness of the signal to the original, and consequently 
the alikeness of the devices the signals were acquired from. If a signal from a different device 
approaches the filter output value for the original signal too closely then we are unable to 
distinguish it from the device that produced the original. 
Due to the noise inherent in any system, we cannot assume that even a properly func-
tioning device will output exactly the same synchronization signal for each frame. Noise from 
surrounding devices, created by a hard disc or CD-ROM being accessed or variations in system 
load, and thermal noise assuredly cause slight variations in the signal from frame to frame. In 
fact, with the aid of temperature recording equipment we have been able to correlate aberra-
tions in the filter output to variations in the ambient temperature of the lab. Furthermore, 
due to the non-ideal properties of the Ethernet cabling parasitic resistance, capacitance, and 
inductancc even the act of measuring the signal on a different portion of the Ethernet cabling, 
or using a different cable altogether, may affect the measured signal. This affect, however, gives 
rise t0 the interesting possibility Of detecting passive taps On the line, which often change the 
effective material parameters of the medium. 
To take into account the inherent variability of every device's output, as well as external 
factors such as temperature and system load variations, a signal profile must be created by 
using a collection of signals taken over a period of time. The filter created by the original signal 
is applied to this collection of signals and the response to each recorded (Figure 3.2) . We have 
found that only 25 sequentially sampled signals are necessary to adequately characterize the 
unique signaling behavior of a device using a matched filter. 
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Figure 3.2 Filter output for 25 frames of an Ethernet device. 
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By examining the filter response for a device over a number of hours, we have determined 
that a device's synchronization signal is under continuous change. In many cases, we have 
discovered that slight variations in the amplitude of the signals are the cause of this variation. 
A subtle change in signal shape, over a period of hours, also changes the filter response. By 
using the average of several synchronization signals for the reference signal we have been able 
to decrease the variation of the filter response; however, this often leads to a corresponding 
increase in false positives. 
3.5 Variations on the matched filter method 
To further improve the efficacy of our method, which we shall term the as generic matched 
filter approach for the remainder of this work, we have devised several variations on the pro-
cedure outlined above to improve our ability to discriminate between highly similar devices. 
Each of these techniques works to amplify slight differences in signal characteristics that are 
too subtle to be distinguished by the original method. The impetus of this work was based 
upon the observation that as the matched filter operation is a sum of products, large-scale 
similarities between signals can often overshadow the small-scale difrerences useful for signal 
profiling. 
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3.5.1 An ensemble of filters 
For a given device, multiple matched filters may be created by selecting a reference signal 
for each portion of the preamble identified in Section 3.2. Matching filters to the transient, 
steady-state, and source MAC address sections of the frame gives a full characterization of the 
broad traits of a signal. An ensemble of filters is utilized, instead of a single large filter, so 
that strong similarities in certain regions of the signal cannot overshadow smaller differences 
in others . 
Selecting multiple reference signals for each section of the signal may also highlight slight 
differences; e.g., each transition, or pair of transitions, of the synchronization signal could be 
matched to different filters. In such a way the granularity of filtering could be arbitrarily 
increased to take into account the smallest of differences. 
3.5.2 Bandpass filtering 
By analyzing the spectrum of signals from a multitude of similar devices, we have found 
that distinguishable differences exist in the frequencies beyond the fundamental frequency of 
the synchronization signal; however, as the fundamental frequency dominates other frequency 
components, in terms of relative power, these differences are often obscured. Applying a band-
pass filter to the reference signal and signal samples minimizes the influence of the fundamental 
frequency on the filter response by removing that portion of the signal altogether. 
We chose to use a Fourier Transform based filter, as the output from a convolution based 
filter proved highly irregular due to the high sampling rate used in acquiring the signals and 
comparatively narrow bandwidth of the filters. To 'apply' the bandpass filter, the Fast Fourier 
Transform was applied to the input signal, X (w) _ ~{x(t) }, to obtain amplitude and phase 
values for the frequency components. The filtering operation is defined as 
X(W) _ X (w), 2~r f h < X (w) < 2~r f l 
(3.1) 
0, otherwise 
where fl and fh give the lowpass and highpass frequency cutoffs for the bandpass filter, re-
spectively. The inverse Fast Fourier 'I~ansform was then utilized to bring the signal back to 
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the time domain. 
Through experimentation, by use of several bandpass filters with increments of 1MHz 
in bandwidth, we have determined that, for some devices, the 13-17MHz frequency range 
exhibits the greatest variation. As the power levels of frequency components beyond 17MHz 
approach that of the noise level, we have found frequencies higher than 17MHz ill-suited for 
discriminatory purposes. 
3.5.3 Normalization 
Let x be an n-dimensional vector. The Euclidean norm of x is denoted by II X II ' where x 
n 
~xkl 2
k=1 
(3.2) 
Normalizing both the reference signal and signal samples, according to the Euclidean norm, 
desensitizes the matched filter to similarities in shape, and increases its sensitivity to variations 
in amplitude. This proves advantageous for discriminating between signals where the differ-
ences exist primarily in their relative amplitudes. However, if the amplitudes of two signals 
are closely matched, while their shapes are not, this form of normalization will decrease our 
ability to distinguish between the two. 
3.5.4 Trimming 
The concept of time-domain trimming was developed in order to minimize the affect of the 
signal amplitude on filter response. By eliminating amplitude dominance, variations in the 
shape of the signal are made apparent. Analogous to the frequency domain trimming used 
in bandpass filtering, time-domain trimming removes the portions of a signal that tend to 
overshadow all others by zeroing the signal amplitude for values greater than a predetermined 
upper bound. By adding a lower bound, and varying the height of each boundary accordingly, 
a window is created that allows for any portion of the signal to be scrutinized by its shape 
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alone. For an arbitrary signal, x(t), the trimming operation is defined as
x (t) , 
hlower C I x (t) I Chipper 
x (t) _ (3.3) 
0, otherwise 
where 
llower 
and 
hipper 
are the amplitude thresholds. 
For example, by only setting an upper bound, the zero-crossings where the signal crosses 
the horizontal axis—of a signal may be examined in order to ensure that the width of a signal 
matches that of the filter. We have found that time-domain trimming is most effective when 
only the signal samples are trimmed. 
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CHAPTER 4. Construction and evaluation of profiles 
The equipment and methods used to acquire the Ethernet signals for analysis are given. 
Methods for calculating the FAR and FRR are discussed. 
4.1 Data collection 
The testbed utilized for data collection consisted of two PCs running GNU Linux; one to 
act as the Test PC (TPC), which houses the Ethernet card we wish to fingerprint, while the 
other, the Data Acquisition PC (DAQPC), makes use of a Tektronix 3052 digital sampling 
oscilloscope, interfaced via an IEEE 488 card and Labview-6, connected to a passively tapped 
internal Ethernet card, to capture Ethernet frames sent to it over a crossover cable by the 
TPC. 
In order to generate traffic for the DAQPC to capture, the TPC is instructed to ping the 
DAQPC. During a typical data acquisition period the TPC will ping the DAQPC 10,000 times. 
To ensure that only traffic from the TPC is captured, only the receiving pins of the DAQPC's 
Ethernet card have been connected to the oscilloscope. In this way we are able to allow the 
DAQPC to respond to the TPC's pings, and ensure that the data acquisition process hasn't 
caused any packet loss. 
Upon detection of an Ethernet frame the oscilloscope begins to sample the signal at a rate 
of 1Gigasamples/s. The signal is sampled 10,000 times, for a total of 10 micro-seconds, with 
8-bits of resolution. The data collected during sampling is sent to the DAQPC via the IEEE 
448 interface, where a custom Labview routine monitoring the interface accepts the data and 
stores the values in a vector we call a record, which is subsequently written to the disc. Each 
captured frame is stored in its own record; all of the records collected for a device during a 
21 
session encompass its dataset. 
Jackson (2006) has covered the technical and procedural aspects of this process in greater 
detail. 
4.2 Filter application 
Having acquired several thousand signal samples from each device over a number of hours, 
we then create a filter for each of the devices using the procedure outlined in Section 3.3. 
The reference signal for each device is selected from, and the operation appropriate to the 
variation performed upon, the first valid record of the device's dataset. In the case of the 
generic matched filter, for example, the reference signal has a period of 4,176 sample points 
and spans roughly the length of the synchronization signal. Following this, the reference signal 
is convolved with each record of its dataset, each of which may or may not have had the 
same variational operation performed upon it, using an FFT-based convolution algorithm. 
Convolving the reference signal with each record of its dataset performs the matched filter 
operation for all possible time-shifts; consequently, an output is created that is equal in length 
to that of the length of the record. This operation is necessary to determine the time of optimal 
alignment, to, between the filter and the record, which results in the maximum filter output, 
as per (2.6). 
Thus, the filter output at the point of maximum alignment corresponds to the maximum 
of the convolution operation. Letting EZ (t) represent the reference signal for the ith device, and 
r~2 (t) the j th record of its dataset, the filter output, µ2 (to), is then 
µi ~to) = max~Ei~t) * r~i ~t)) for j = 1. . . n (4.1) 
where n is the number of records in the device's dataset (Figure 4.1) . This procedure is followed 
for each device in order to determine the filter response of each record in its dataset. 
Having determined the filter output for each record of its own dataset, we then apply the 
filter to each record of the other device's datasets in order to determine the alikeness of their 
respective signals (Figure 4.2). Letting ~y2 ~(to) represent the filter output using the Zt~ device's 
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Figure 4.1 Filter output for 10,000 records of an Ethernet device. 
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Figure 4.2 Filter output for 10,000 records of two different Ethernet devices 
using the same filter. 
filter applied to the kth device's dataset 
`Y~,k~to~ = maY~Ei~t~ * ~k~t~~ for j = 1. . . n (4.2) 
As can be seen from Figure 4.2, the respective filter outputs of Device i and Device 1~ 
do not overlap. Following the explanation set forth in Section 3.4, we are therefore able to 
discriminate between Device i and Device I~. 
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4.3 Thresholds 
In order to account for changes in signal characteristics over time, the effects of which 
correspond to the variability in filter output seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we have introduced a 
tolerance, b, for the maximum amount of deviation in filter response acceptable before a signal 
is labeled as too different from the original. In order to take into account past behavior, we 
require that the next n-frames resemble the previous n-frames, fib. In this way a device may 
be adaptively tracked as its signal changes over time. Mathematically, this is stated by defining 
two thresholds for the maximum amount of positive, th+, and negative, th_, deviation in filter 
output allowed over the previous n-frames 
t~L+(lei . . . ~ Z+n_1) = maX(~,GZ_1 . . . ~2_n)(1 + ~) 
th_ (/-~i . . . µz+n_1) = min(µi_1 . . . I~2_n) (1 — b) 
where ,u2 represents the filter output of the ith frame. We have found that setting n equal to 
the number of samples used to learn the behavior of a device proves adequate for tracking the 
signal over time. 
During our experiments the filter output for the first 25 frames of a device were used as 
training data, whereby an appropriate value for b would be determined by stipulating that 
zero false-rejects would occur for the next 25 filter outputs. A minimum value of .001 for 
b was imposed, and incremented by .001 until the aforementioned condition was met. After 
observing a device's behavior over time the value of b can be adjusted to better fit the unique 
behavior of the card. We have also found that large, spurious, deviations do occur for all 
Ethernet devices, so a perfect acceptance rate cannot be obtained unless one is willing to 
allow a certain number of significant deviations every n-frames, or set b unreasonably high. 
As with any system with statistical variation, a balance must be found for b that results in 
acceptable false-reject (FRR) and false-accept (FAR) rates. 
Using extrema to set thresholds allows for the possibility that aberrations not represen-
tative of the overall character of the data, possibly intruding devices, may unfairly influence 
acceptable output. To address this concern, we have devised a scheme that uses the average 
(4.3) 
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10000 
behavior of the output as the baseline, and sets the bounds according its standard deviation 
the (µ2 . . .µ2-I-n_1) = mean(µ2- 1 . . . µ2_n) _.}_ b x m(µ2_1 . . . µ2_n) 
(4.4) 
t~L_ (l-~i . . . µ2+n_1) = mean(µ2_1 . . . µ 2 _n) — b X m(µ2_1 . . . l-~2_n) 
where ~ is the standard deviation of the filter outputs. The minimum value for b is initially set 
to 3, and is increased by 1 in the same manner as described above for the max/min method, 
until a suitable value is found. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the thresholds determined by each of these methods for the same 
filter output. While none of the thresholds differ greatly, we have still found it preferable to 
use the latter method, for the aforementioned reason. A comparison of the effects of these two 
approaches on FAR and FRR is given in the results section. 
4.4 Acceptance testing 
Following the procedure set forth in the previous section, a value for b can be determined 
that is expected to provide an acceptable FRR (less than .009 in our experiments) . Using the 
response of the filter for the ith device to the 26th through 50th records of its own dataset, 
µ26...5o (to), as training data in conjunction with (4.3 or 4.4), thresholds can be established for 
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is the same. 
the next 25 filter outputs. If the filter response for one of the next 25 records lies outside of 
the bounds set by these thresholds then its corresponding record is marked as rejected, and is 
not used in determining the thresholds for the next 25 outputs. This procedure is followed for 
the remainder of the filter responses in the device's dataset. The FRR is then calculated using 
FRR = 
n-50 
where nr is the number of rejected records and n is the number of total records. 
nr
4.5 Intrusion testing 
(4.5) 
Whereas it is possible to determine the FRR by sequentially applying (4.3 or 4.4) to each 
of the next 25 filter outputs, the FAR may not be determined in such a sequential manner, as 
it cannot be known where to begin comparing the output of the ith device's filter applied to 
the ~t~ device's dataset. Simply comparing the distributions of the filter output for the two 
cases would also produce an inaccurate FAR, as the filter output for each device is changing 
in time, and it would not be unreasonable to assume that at a particular point in time one 
device will have the same filter response as another device at a different point in time (Figure 
4.4). 
Thus, to calculate an accurate FAR, we assume that the filter response for each record of 
the nth device's dataset using the ith device's filter, 'YZ ~~n(to), where n is the number of records 
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in a dataset, is equally likely. Based upon this assumption, random numbers between one and 
n are generated to serve as an index used in deciding the starting value of j, for the filter 
response ~y2 ~ (to) . 
Using the first value of the index for j, the next 24 filter responses, ~y2 ~~+24(tp), are com- 
pared to the threshold values calculated for ~Z • • • 25 (to) to check whether or not a record from 
yZ~~~+24(to) would be accepted as a record from µi"'25(to). This procedure is followed for each 
25 record segment of µ26•••n(to), where every 25 records a new value of j is chosen by taking the 
next value in the index. The total number of index values generated should then be n divided 
by 25. The FAR is then calculated using 
FAR = 
na 
n 
(4.6) 
where na is the number of accepted records and n is the number of total records. 
This procedure is repeated 100 times, with new index values chosen for each iteration. The 
FAR for each iteration are then averaged to produce the total FAR. Repeated testing using 
this method has provided consistent values for the FAR. 
4.6 Comments on time complexity 
Using an FFT-based convolution in applying the matched filter to an input signal requires 
two FFTs and one inverse-FFT, to wit 
µ(to) =max (~'-1 {~{a(to - t)} • .~{,~3(t)}}) (4.7) 
where a(to - t) and /~(t) are defined as in Section 2.3. Each of these three transforms is of 
O (n lg n) complexity. It becomes readily apparent that using such an approach to perform a 
great many of the additional tests outlined in Section 3.5 will become computationally infeasible 
in real-time. It is possible, however, to reduce the matched filter operation to O(n) complexity 
for subsequent applications of the filter after one has made an initial use of the convolution 
approach. 
Returning to our discussion of the definition of the matched filter in Section 2.3, we see 
that by (2.3) the matched filter operation is reduced to an inner-product of two signals if the 
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signals are aligned. To determine the alignment of two signals, and thus linear complexity 
for the filter application, let E(t) represent our reference signal, and to(e(t)) correspond to 
the point of maximum alignment, obtained through convolution, between the record that e(t) 
is derived from and E(t) itself. ~zrthermore, take to(,~(t))E~t~ to be the point of maximum 
alignment between an input signal, ~(t), and the reference signal (again, obtained in an earlier 
convolution of the two signals). Define the difference between these alignment points asp = 
to(~(t))E~t~ — to(e(t)). The filter output is then determined by 
Tf
µ(to) = J e(t),6 (t + to(e(t)) — T + p) dt (4.8) 0 
where T is the length of e(t). The above assumes that the alignment point is taken with respect 
to the end of reference signal. 
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CHAPTER 5. Analysis 
The results of the matched filter methodology for signal profiling are presented for 16 
devices, with 10, 000 records per dataset, consisting of a combination of three different mod-
els. Testing parameters are discussed and metrics indicating the overall effectiveness of the 
individual and combined approaches are given. 
5.1 Variety and scope of tests 
The aim of the present work is two fold: to establish the value of a generic matched filter 
approach to device identification and to measure the usefulness of the variations set forth in 
Section 3.5. To this end, a total of 526 tests were performed, the precise nature of which we 
shall describe shortly. A complete analysis of the available data requires that each test be 
carried out on every one of the 10,000 records in each device's dataset, and that each device 
be tested against every other device using itself as a reference, which yields 
Tests Records 2  Datasets Tests 526 • 10000 • 16 = 1.3466e -~ 09 
Record Dataset Complete analysis Complete analysis 
Unless specified otherwise, each test used the same portion of the synchronization signal 
(sample points 2475-8650) as the reference signal before performing its respective operation. 
5.1.1 Bandpass filtering 
A total of 210 filters were utilized to exhaustively test the a bandwidth of 0-20MHz at 1MHz 
increments (Table 5.1). As the power of the frequency components of the synchronization signal 
beyond 20MHz are slight, it was decided that extending the bandwidth beyond this range 
would contribute little as these small contributions to the filter output would be necessarily 
overshadowed. Both the reference signal and test signal were filtered. 
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Table 5.1 Bandwidths of bandpass filters used in variational testing. 
fh .fl 
19 20 
18 19 20 
1 2 3 20 
0 1 2 3 20 
5.1.2 An ensemble of filters 
Three additional filters were utilized to highlight areas of change in the synchronization 
signal, as we believe that when the signal is undergoing change, so too is the device's circu-
ity, which in turn might produce unique transients: the transient and synchronization signal 
(sample points 2300-8650), the transient only (sample points 2300-2475), and the transition 
from the synchronization signal to destination MAC address (sample points 8650-8829). A 
filter spanning the entirety of the captured signal (sample points 2300-8829) was also created 
so as to maximize the output of the filter. 
5.1.3 Normalization 
The Euclidean norm was applied to the aligned test and reference signals in each test. As 
such, there are only 263 unique tests; the remainder are simply the output of the original test 
divided by the product of the norm of the reference and aligned test signals. 
5.1.4 Trimming 
Amplitude trimming, using increments of .25 volts from zero to three volts, was utilized in 
two ways. Lower-trimming sets data values below a give level to zero, while upper-trimming 
sets the values above said level to zero. More precisely, for an input signal, x(t), lower-trimming 
is defined as 
for l = 1, 2, . . . , 12. (5.2) 
x(t), otherwise 
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while for upper-trimming 
{ x(t), otherwise for l = 1, 2, . . . ,12. (5.3) 
These trimming procedures were applied to the test signal individually in one instance, and 
both the reference and test signals in another. 
5.2 Evaluation of the generic matched filter 
A confusion matrix, which indicates the FRR of a device as well as it's FAR with respect to 
other devices, has been employed to illustrate the results of our acceptance and intrusion testing 
for the generic matched filter. Table 5.2 was constructed using the max/min thresholding 
scheme, while Table 5.3 used the mean/std approach. The FRR is deduced by subtracting 
the diagonal elements from one, while the FAR is simply the off-diagonal elements. Perfect 
detection and rejection would result in a matrix where the diagonal is one and off-diagonal 
elements are zero. The naming convention mXc Y is utilized to denote card Y of model X. 
As can be seen from the tables, results do not vary greatly between the two thresholding 
approaches when a great number of collisions are present; however, when less overlap occurs 
the mean/std approach generally outperforms the max/min technique (as is the case for m6c~, 
for example) . In both cases, The FRR is sufficiently low (less than 1°~0), and for different 
model cards we have near perfect detection, while some cards of the same model are difficult 
to differentiate. It should be noted, however, that the above results depict the worst case 
scenario; i.e., all of the above cards were purchased in bulk, at the same time, and most likely 
originated from the same manufacturing lot. A prospective intruder would be hard pressed to 
acquire a card from the lot, or even determine the devices' time of manufacture to know what 
to begin searching for. 
5.2.1 Quantitative evaluation of the confusion matrix 
While the above confusion matrices are useful for illustrating the FRR of a particular device, 
and the FAR with respect to individual intruder devices, they are ill-suited for ascertaining the 
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overall efFectiveness of the method for a given class of devices. To accomplish this task, several 
metrics have been devised that, when interpreted collectively, give a reasonable account of the 
performance of a classification system [Kohavi and Provost (1998)]. 
5.2.1.1 Metrics 
In order to evaluate the aforementioned confusion matrices, we must first go about the 
task of converting the false-accept and false-reject rates into true positive (TP), false negative 
(FN), false positive (FP), and true negative (TN) counts. In the context of this work, a TP 
is understood to be an accepted record from a known device, while a FP is a rejected record 
from a known device. A FP is then an accepted record from an intruder device. Conversely, a 
TN is a rejected record from an intruder device. Conversion of the FRR and FAR of the ith 
device to these counts is achieved through the use of the following formulae 
TPZ = 9950 • (1 — FRRi,i) (5.4) 
FNZ = 9950 —TPZ (5.5) 
16 
FPZ = ~ 9950 • FARZ,~~Z (5.6) 
j=1 
T NZ = 10000. 15 —FPZ (5.7) 
where i and j are the row and column indices of the confusion matrix, respectively 
Having determined the total number of TP, FN, FP, and FN for a given device, we can then 
calculate the accuracy (percentage of accepts and rejects that are correct) precision (percentage 
of accepts that are correct), recall (percentage of known device records that are correctly 
accepted), and specificity (percentage of intruder device records that are correctly rejected) of 
its filter output, where 
Accuracy (A) _ 
Precision (P) _ 
Recall (R) _ 
Specificity (S) _ 
T P -~- T N 
TP~TN-~FP+FN 
TP 
TP -~ FP 
TP 
TP-~FN 
TN 
TN~-FP 
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Table 5.4 Intra-model APRS values for the m.~ family of devices. 
Tested Card A P R S 
m4cl .9987 1.000 .9961 1.000 
m4c2 .7163 .5399 .9965 .5765 
m4c3 .6987 .5249 .9956 .5506 
mean .8046 .6883 .9961 .7090 
Table 5.5 Intra-model APRS values for the m5 family of devices. 
Tested Card A P R S 
m5cl 
m5c2 
m5c3 
m5c4 
m5c5 
m5c6 
m5c6 
m5c7 
m5c8 
m5c9 
m5c 10 
mean 
.8988 .4964 .9969 .8879 
.9003 .5001 .9970 .8895 
.8998 .4990 1.000 .8887 
.9996 .9963 .9999 .9996 
.9993 1.000 .9928 1.000 
.8204 .3571 .9999 .8005 
.8204 .3571 .9999 .8005 
.9018 .5041 .9940 .8916 
.8823 .4586 .9957 .8697 
.9993 .9999 .9932 1.000 
.9443 .6427 .9938 .9388 
.9246 .6454 .9963 .9166 
Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 give the APRS values calculated using the TP, FN, FP, and FN 
totals for devices of the same model, while Table 5.7 incorporates cross-model data for these 
counts. We have made this distinction for two reasons: firstly, to highlight the fact that while 
the precision is quite low for most cards, it does not increase when cross-model comparisons are 
made, which means that between different models of devices there are few collisions. Secondly, 
while the specificity is somewhat low for intra-model comparisons, it is drastically improved 
when inter-model data is taken into consideration, which is to be expected, as again there are 
few inter-model collisions. These two points, when taken together, imply that in a diverse 
environment i.e., one in which a great number of differing model devices are present the 
generic matched filter would perform well at differentiating devices from one another. 
Table 5.6 Intra-model APRS values for the m6 family of devices. 
Tested Card A P R 
m6cl .8834 .7408 .9995 
m6c2 .8592 .7029 .9992 
m6c3 .9712 .9208 .9994 
mean .9046 .7882 .9994 
S 
.8256 
.7893 
.9571 
.8573 
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Table 5.7 Inter-model APRS values. 
Tested Card A P R S 
m4cl .9998 1.000 .9961 1.000 
m4c2 .9468 .5399 .9965 .9435 
m4c3 .9435 .5249 .9956 .9401 
m5cl .9367 .4964 .9969 .9327 
m5c2 .9377 .5001 .9970 .9337 
m5c3 .9374 .4990 1.000 .9332 
m5c4 .9998 .9963 .9999 .9998 
m5c5 .9996 1.000 .9928 1.000 
m5c6 .8878 .3571 .9999 .8803 
m5c7 .9387 .5041 .9940 .9350 
m5c8 .9265 .4586 .9957 .9218 
m5c9 .9996 .9999 .9932 1.000 
m5c 10 .9652 .6427 .9938 .9633 
m6c1 .9782 .7408 .9995 .9767 
m6c2 .9696 .6725 .9992 .9676 
m6c3 .9142 .4207 .9994 .9085 
mean .9551 .6471 .9968 .9523 
5.3 Evaluation of variations 
An exposition and discussion of the confusion matrices and respective inter/intea-model 
APRS tables for each of the 526 tests performed in our analysis (in total, 526 confusion 
matrices, 1578 intra-model APRS tables, and 526 inter-model tables) would not only require 
more space and time than currently available, but in the end would (and indeed, does) show 
what is easily surmised: that some of the techniques work some of the time, but that none 
of the techniques work all of the time. This is not to say that a careful examination of these 
results is not without merit . Indeed, a detailed analysis of such data would probably strengthen 
our understanding of which parts of device's signal are most unique or common, and variable 
or consistent. Such information would be of great aid in the devising of new techniques for 
signal discrimination. Nonetheless, our task is to explore the efficacy of these variations and 
to accomplish this we must turn to different means of evaluation. 
If no particular variation is itself a panacea in the majority of cases then it makes sense, 
and is indeed preferable, to evaluate their collective effectiveness; a suitable measure of which 
is the average number of tests passed per record for each device. If the averages of the test and 
reference devices are different (with due regard to the the variability of these averages) then 
we may state that, in general, they are differentiable though it is not possible to give exact 
values for the FRR or FAR. 
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Table 5.8 gives the mean number of tests passed per record for each device via a confusion 
matrix, while Table 5.9 gives the standard deviation of the means. To calculate the average of 
the total number of tests passed per record for acceptance testing, and for a single iteration 
of the intrusion tests, a tally kept for each of the 10,000 records, indicating the total number 
of tests passed for that record, was averaged. In calculating the overall average for intruder 
devices, the mean of each of the 100 iterations was used, while the standard deviation of 
each of the 100 iterations was averaged to obtain the overall standard deviation. As the tables 
indicate, the variations, when used together, should provide an effective means of differentiating 
devices even in the presence of a highly homogeneous environment . 
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CHAPTER 6. Future work 
Several important issues regarding the variability of a device's analog signal require ad-
ditional consideration. For example, under what conditions does the signal vary, how does 
device aging affect signaling characteristics, and how can a signal from a system that has lost 
and re-established a connection with the network be tracked? A recent comparative study by 
our research group, which sought to establish the degree to which the signaling behavior of the 
devices profiled in this work vary, showed that frames acquired but one year later exhibited 
amplitude differences of up to .25 volts. 
An immediate area of consideration is extending this work to include different networking 
systems. Initial work has already begun on attempting to profile 100Mb Ethernet signals. 
Preliminary results indicate that the aforementioned techniques will be adequate for discrim-
inating between different model devices; however, a deeper investigation into the signaling 
characteristics of 100Mb Ethernet devices may be required in order to provide accurate results 
for devices of the same model. Other work includes analyzing wireless signals from 802.11b, 
sensor networks, and RFID systems. Attempting t0 optimize the matched filter for the profiling 
of wireless signals poses serious challenges; foremost among them, adjusting the sensitivity of 
the filter to handle fluctuations of amplitude to accommodate roaming of the device. Possible 
solutions to this problem include signal normalization and equalization. 
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